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INTRODUCTION
 
There is a strong debut on the Islamic mode of 
financing which do not underlie with the banner of 
Islamic banking in which constitutes the elimination 
of injustices of the interest-based system as ordained 
by Holy Qur'an. According to Rosly, 
Anwar, et al., (2003) and Usmani, (2004)
mode of financing still cannot be expected to 
completely free from the injustices of the interest
based system or to contribute to the achievement of 
socioeconomic objectives which Islam seeks t
achieve. Although there are many views can be 
discussed towards the mode of financing adopted by 
the Islamic banks, this study aims to explain whether 
Shari’ahsupervisory boards (SSB) and their 
remuneration have any significant influence towards 
the choices of Islamic banks mode of financing. 
Based on the work of Ahmad, (2014)
that, SSB plays an important role, particularly in 
harmonizing the Islamic rules and guidelines in 
Islamic banks (i.e.,Shari’ah-compliance gatekeeper), 
this study argued that the choices of style of 
financing by Islamic banks should be tempted by this 
board as to avoid any injustices as what has been 
proposed in Shari’ah Law. In other words, the SSB 
should put highly concern with regard to any mode 
of financing by the Islamic bank in which are not 
aligned with the profit- sharing principles. 
 
Literature Review: 
Islamic mode of financing drawbacks
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A B S T R A C T  
This paper examines the relationships between the effectiveness of 
board (SSB), their remuneration and mode of financing 
effectiveness is evaluated by an index based on 9 attributes score. This study comprises 
18 Islamic banks in which operating in Malaysia from the year 2012 to 2014 a
sample. Our regression analysis shows that the effectiveness of SSB does not concern 
with the mode of Islamic bank financing. However, we found that SSB remuneration 
and bank’s financial growth shown a positive and significant relationship with mode of
financing. The implications of these findings are discussed. 
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drawbacks of Murabahah or mark
financing. First, on the matter of ownership and 
ownership whereby bank has been claimed not 
actually purchase the asset prior to sale. Second, is 
on the issue of Murabahah’s
Third, is on the extent profit deter
consideration of time value of money with a fixed 
compensation since the Murabahah
installment sale. Fourth, the issue of customer 
defaulted toward Murabahah 
the liability of an asset that found defective 
delivery and lastly is on the principle of 
daman where entitlement for gain subjects to liability 
for loss that being applied in the contract. 
 
Shari’ah Governance: 
According to Alman, (2012)
Supervisory Board (SSB) is one of
governance mechanisms which involves the 
monitoring of Islamic banks' activities in accordance 
to the Sharia (i.e. Islamic law) specifically on its 
implementation and compliance. It is a part of the big 
corporate governance framework and what mak
different is only by the existence of 
Supervisory Board or Shari’ah
Committee or Shari’ah unit (Rahajeng, 2012)
Shari’ah governance is part of corporate governance, 
thus, good and effective SSB should reflect the issue 
of independence, transparent, accountable, 
responsible, and fair Bhatti and Bhatti (2010)
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Farook, and Lanis (2011), argued that the unique 
attributes of SSB must be clarified as to 
incorporating SSB as part of corporate governance 
mechanisms framework. Although the existence of 
SSB seemed to be able to monitor Islamic banking 
activities, there are still Islamic banks have 
experienced failure similar to that of conventional in 
the recent year. Supposedly, by the attaining of 
Shari’ah and good corporate governance, Islamic 
bank basically able to achieve Shari’ah objectives 
(i.e., Maqasid Shari’ah). However, having this kind 
of committee is sort not like providing reliable 
Shari’ah Governance in which utmost important and 
beneficial to all parties inside and outside the Islamic 
Banks.  
 
Issues on Shari’ah Supervisory Board: 
It is prevalent that the roles of shari’ah 
supervisory council, shari’ah committee or shari’ah 
supervisory board emphasized on matter pertaining 
to shari’ah compliance see (Besar, et al., 2009). 
These committees do not participate directly in the 
risk management process as evidenced from the 
Islamic banks annual reports shows that SSB does 
not appear in the risk management committee. The 
opinion of the SSB of shari’ah related matters are 
reported to the board of directors as they are the one 
who make the final decision.  
Hence, the shari’ah committee basically exists 
merely to fulfill the central bank of Malaysia or 
BNM’s requirement for Islamic banks establishment. 
The interest of board of directors may depart from 
interest of their stakeholders in the context of 
Ummah or Muslim nation and community. Thus, it is 
very important to understand that to whom these SSB 
are accountable and how far it existence is really 
relevant at the banks level.  
A study by Hasan, (2011) shows that SSB is 
accountable to the board of directors in many 
respects as their remuneration, appointment and 
dismissal are subjected to the approval of the board 
of directors at bank level. The existences of superior 
board at central banks level also known as shari’ah 
advisory council should be sufficient to guide Islamic 
bank to comply with shari’ah requirements.  
The rationale of having two-tier board system 
was aimed to provide better supervisory at a higher 
agency cost from shareholders or depositors return. 
The existence of SSB should have contributed 
greatly for the betterment of the ummah through 
promoting profit and loss sharing based financing. 
On contrary, the SSB committee at bank level was 
established to minimize reputational risk originated 
from shari’ah noncompliance matters see (Akhtar, 
2006). However, the Islamic banks’ reputational risk 
may arises from other sources such as risk taking 
appetite of Islamic banks’ financing portfolio which 
is predominately of debt based such as Murabahah 
and Baibhithaman Ajil. From the preliminary 
analysis of the annual report shows that more than 
50% of Islamic bank portfolio is concentrated in non-
profit and loss sharing mode. 
 
Profitability: 
Net profit after taxes to total assets was used as 
proxy for determining banks profitability. Ahmad 
and Mohammad (2011) shows that ROA is 
negatively significant to credit risk, which implies 
that increase in credit risk reduce Islamic banks 
profitability in Middle East and Southeast Asia 
countries. Cebenoyan and Strahan (2004) show 
banks that engage in buying and selling loans to 
manage credit risk increase their profitability.  
Ahmad and Mohammad (2010) show that 
technical and scale efficiency is positively significant 
to credit risk. The increases of return on assets and 
profitability reduce credit risks for conventional 
banks, according to Miller and Noulas (1997) and 
Said and Tumin (2011) show that as banks were 
exposed to high-risks loans, their higher 
accumulation of unpaid loans result in lower 
profitability.  
Boudriga, et al.(2009) explain that association 
between performance and risk does not hold at 
aggregate level rather it may hold at bank level. The 
possible explanations for this phenomenon could be 
due to both are operating side by side in the same 
economic environment, which possibly exposed 
them to similar risk. Another possible reason is that 
interest rate was used as benchmark by Islamic banks 
to determine profit rate as a result they are rivaling 
against each other to generate profit from the same 
market Nienhaus (1983).   
The past research of Bader et al. (2008), 
Mohamad et al. (2008) who found that there are no 
difference in term of profit between Islamic banks 
and conventional banks in GCC, MENA, ASIA and 
South East Asia. Hence, the sources of credit risk is 
created with excessive concentration of financing in 
risky sectors which is prominent for Murabahah and 
Bai Bhithaman ajil financing that is mainly in 
construction, property and real estate sectors which is 




Broad money (M3) indicates that increase in 
money supply lower the credit risk as the borrowers 
able to service their loan obligations as suggested in 
Ahmad and Ariff (2007) suggest that increase in 
money supply reduce the interest rate as borrower 
were able to obtain cheaper fun consequently reduce 
credit risk whereas lower money supply increase 
credit risks. According to Haron and Wan Azmi 
(2008) Kok et al. (2012) indicates that positive 
significant to banks profit which implies that Islamic 
banks were able to generate more profit when central 
bank’s eases up the money supply policy conversely 
this would have negative significant to credit risk as 
reported in previous studies (Bourke, 1989), 
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(Molyneux and Thornton, 1992), (Haron and Azmi, 
2004) and (Haron, 1996). 
 
GDP: 
GDP was used as indicators for overall 
economic activities. Haq and Heaney (2012) suggest 
that improve in economic performance as indicate by 
GDP growth reduce credit risk. Marcucci and 
Quagliariello (2009) the study shows that during 
economic downturn risky portfolio bank exposed to 
credit risks compared less risky ones. Jakubík (2007) 
higher GDP growth leads to lower credit risk which 
is consistent to intuition of economic theory as also 
found in Jakubík (2007) and Castro (2013) suggest 
that deterioration of economic growth leading to 
unemployment consequently increases in credit risk. 
According toBoudrigaet al.(2009) suggest that 
economic health contribute to explain problem loan, 
economic recovery improve borrower credit quality 




This study employs agency theory as 
underpinning theory to develop the hypotheses. The 
following hypotheses have been developed in this 
study: 
 
H1 There is positive relationships between the 
effectiveness of SSB and mode offinancing adopted 
by the Islamic bank. 
H2 There is no significant relationship between 
SSB remuneration and mode of financing adopted by 
the Islamic bank. 
 
Methodology: 
Sample of this study comprises 18 Islamic banks 
in which operating in Malaysia from the year 2012 
till 2014. To extract the mode of financing and 
information about SSB (i.e., effectiveness and 
remuneration), the annual reports of Islamic bank 
were scrutinized.   
The dependent variable of this study denoted as 
MODE is proxy by Bai Bhithaman Ajil (deferred 
payment sales)to total Finance. This study measured 
SSB effectiveness based on 9 attributes scored in 
which aggregately measured. The attributes is 
captured based on four elements of effectiveness 
which is proposed in conventional corporate 
governance model (Ika and Ghazali, 2012; DeZoort, 
et al., 2002). These elements are 1) composition, 2) 
adequate authority, 3) resources and 4) diligence.  
Since Shari’ah governance is part of corporate 
governance model (Farook et al., 2011), the use of 
this elements can be assumed valid.  
The study employs ordinary least square OLS on 
the dependent variables denoted as MODE and six 
independent variables namely SSBREMU, 
FGROWTH, PROF, MSUPP, GDP and SSBEFF or 
the efficiency index of shari’ah supervisory board 
which is measured based on thier nationality, 
qualification, gender diversity, shari’ah compliance 
oriented, risk management partcipation, size of SSB 
board, number of meeting and experience.  
The score is given based on the disclosed items. 
Each disclosed score is assigned with 1 for disclose 
where 0 undiscosed. Hence, the accumulated score is 
total up to determine the index score. Those banks 
with highest disclosure produce higher index score. 
FGROWTH is proxy for financing growth based on 
total financing of Islamic banks. 
 
Table 1: Measurement of Explanatory Variables 
Variable  Composition of variables 
MODE : Bai Bhithaman Ajil to Total Finance 
SSBEFF : SSB effectiveness Index = Company’s actual score on SSB characteristics/ company 
total possible score of SSB characteristics 
SSBREMU : Log of Total Remuneration 
FGROWTH : Log of Total Finance 
PROF : Net profit to Total assets 
MSUPP : M2 plus financial assets 
GDP : Growth rate of real GDP 
ε   : Error term 
 
To examine the relationship between SSB 
effectiveness, remuneration, control variables and the 
mode of financing, a multiple linear regression is 





+β4PROFi+β5MSUPPi+ β6GDPi  +εi      
 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Descriptive statistics for the variables is shown 
in Table 2. The average of MODE is 53 percent 
indicating that more than half of the total finance is 
dominated by Bai bhithaman Ajil. The mean score of 
0.7857 for SSBEFF indicates that on average, SSB in 
Malaysia quite effective. On average, all the SSB 
members are being paid of RM518, 346 annually, 
however, there are some bank that did not disclose 
the SSB remuneration clearly.  
The study shows that the assets size of Islamic 
banks are consist of small, medium and large banks 
where high standard deviation of .78972 indicates 
that banks are differences in size with average size of 
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RM27,942,718.  
The financing growth on the other hand shows 
that on average the banks growth at 3.8% during the 
study period with high standard deviation 1.25395. 
This could be the result of different financing 
strategy adopted by each bank their financing 
portfolio are different in its compositions subject to 
their risk preferences. The PROF ratio exhibits that 
on average the Islamic banks earn 8.6% profit during 
the period of study with standard deviation of 
0.02689this implies that Islamic banks profit are at 
the same level regardless of their differences in size.
 
Table 2: Descriptive Results  
N=42 
 Mean Standard Deviation 
MODE .5295 .23113 
SSBEFF .7857 .06639 
SSBREMU 12.7312 .78972 
FGROWTH 16.1884 1.25395 
PROF .0864 .02689 
MSUPP 2.300 .5959 
GDP 8.300 1.0054 
 
Table 3 presents the outcomes of the regression 
analysis between the Mode of financing, SSB 
effectiveness and control variables. The Variance 
Inflation Factor (VIF) statistics indicate that 
multicollinearity does not exist in the model as the 
values are less than 10. The model explains 22.3 
percent of the variation towards the mode of 
financing, which is relatively low. Although the 
adjusted R2 is low, the finding is consistent with 
those of the previous governance studies, which 
pointed out that the low R2 iscommon in corporate 
governance researches see (Farook, et al., 
2011)and(Abdul Rahman, et al., 2013). Our analysis 
show that SSBEFF does not have significant 
relationship with mode of financing but there are 
significant relationship between SSBREMU and 
FGROWTH. Table 3 shows that SSBREMU (t value 
= 1.77) has a significant and positive relationship 
with the mode of Islamic bank financing, at p < 0.1 
in which indicates that the increase in BBA moves in 
tandem with the increase in SSB’s remuneration.  
It’s not a matter of SSB effectiveness, but it 
seems that their remuneration may determine the 
preferences toward BBA and Murabahah mode of 
financing. This might hold a truth since we found 
that there is an insignificant portion of these asset 
portfolios is mainly dominated by murabahah, BBA 
and other than profit and loss mode of financing. In 
addition, judging from the FGROWTH that is 
positively significant to MODE as reported, we also 
perceived that the trade-based mode of financing that 
must be applied temporarily by Islamic bank as for 
their transitional phase is not much concern after 25 
years, it sort like they are maximizing the 
shareholders wealth. 
 
Table 3: Regression Results 
Model  Pred. Sign Coeff. SE t Sig. VIF 
(Constant)  -1.454 1.077 -1.35 .186 - 
SSBEFF + -.017 0.574 -.029 .977 1.322 
SSBREMU 0 .086 .049 1.77 .085* 1.338 
Control Variables 
FGROWTH + .067 .038 1.77 .085* 2.032 
PROF + .724 1.614 .448 .657 1.716 
MSUPP +/- -.058 .089 -.648 .521 2.574 
GDP +/- -.013 .055 -.245 .808 2.774 
R2  0.228                        P value            0.059  
Adjusted R2 0.203                        N                      42 
F statistic  2.275                        
Note: ***Significant at 0.01 level, **significant at 0.05 level,  *significant at 0.1 level. 
 
In another view, the ineffectiveness of SSB 
committee can be excused due to a relationship with 
the management making way for their long period of 
trust (see Ika and Ghazali, 2012; Rahman et al. 
2012). SSB assessment may have been influenced by 
the management decisions since their appointment to 
the board is merely due to their relationship with the 
company. The study includes gross domestic product 
GDP and money supply MSUPP as external 
determinants.However, the finding shows negative 
but insignificant of both macroeconomic factors on 
the financing preference of Islamic banks with p-
value = 0.521 and 0.808 respectively. This is 
consistant with the notion that Islamic banks are 
crisis proof given the unique assets and liabilities that 
allow Islamic banks to share their risk with its 
investment account holders. This internal liquidity 
advantage allows Islamic banks to absorb the shocks 
in the event of financial turmoil. 
 
Conclusion: 
The objective of this study is to examine the 
influence of SSB effectiveness and their 
remuneration to the choices of Islamic mode of 
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financing by Malaysian Islamic bank. The analysis 
shows that an effective SSB does not have significant 
bearing towards the choice of Islamic mode of 
financing in Malaysia but their remuneration have. 
Intrinsically, this finding might give some insight 
towards the notion of ‘cosmetic reason’ (Zaman, et 
al., 2001) for regulator, policy maker and another 
researcher on the effectiveness and the existence of 
SSB in Malaysia especially when incorporating SSBs 
as part of the corporate governance mechanism. 
However, it should be noted that the finding in this 
study is considered small due to the some limitation 
and should becarefully generalized by other 
researcher. It is suggested that further studyto be 
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